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[p.1] Emotional Inhibition: A Discourse Analysis of Disclosure 
 
Abstract 
Evidence generated within the emotional disclosure paradigm (EDP) suggests that talking or 
writing about emotional experiences produces health benefits, but recent meta-analyses have 
questioned its efficacy. Studies within the EDP typically rely upon a unidimensional and 
relatively unsophisticated notion of emotional inhibition, and tend to use quantitative forms 
of content analysis to identify associations between percentages of word types and positive or 
negative health outcomes. In this paper we use a case study to show how a qualitative 
discourse analysis has the potential to identify more of the complexity linking the disclosure 
practices and styles that may be associated with emotional inhibition. This may illuminate the 
apparent lack of evidence for efficacy of the EDP by enabling more comprehensive 
theorisations of the variations within it. 
 
Introduction 
In health psychology, the possible links between emotional inhibition, emotional expression 
and wellbeing have been extensively discussed. Whilst it is considered adaptive for people to 
inhibit their feelings to some extent, problems have been associated with very high (Petrie, 
Booth, & Pennebaker, 1998) and very low (Linville, 1996) levels of emotional inhibition. A 
significant proportion of the research into the health effects of emotional inhibition and 
expression is conducted within the emotional disclosure paradigm (EDP), within which 
talking or writing about emotional experiences is associated with health benefits; however, 
some recent meta-analyses have suggested that the EDP shows little evidence of efficacy and 
should be reassessed. In this paper, we propose that any such reassessment might usefully 
clarify the meaning of the key concept of inhibition. We then present a discourse analysis of 
 
some relevant data, and use this to show that the kinds of linguistic analyses typically 
conducted within the EDP might be insufficiently sensitive to variation in their data. 
Consequently, important effects might be getting masked, and error variation being 
introduced. 
There is a considerable body of literature exploring the associations between the 
inhibition or non-expression of emotion and various forms of pathology [p.2] and ill-health. 
For example, emotional inhibition is seen to be related to psychological processes associated 
with problems of anxiety (Hirshfield et al, 1992; Krause et al., 2002; Turner & Beidel, 1996), 
mood (Goeleven, et al., 2007; Krause et al., 2002) and dissociation (Simeon, et al., 2002). 
Shading across from the psychological to the physiological, emotional inhibition has been 
associated with raised physiological arousal (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Gross & 
Levenson, 1993; 1997; Wenger et al, 1990); and increased illness (Cole et al., 1996; Larson 
& Chastain, 1990; Redford & Barefoot, 1988; Temoshok, 1985; Weidner et al., 1989). 
Emotional inhibition, then, straddles the uncertain terrain between body and mind: wholly of 
neither, it is associated with effects within both. 
Numerous studies within the EDP exemplify this transgression of conventional 
dualisms, using what is sometimes called “the expression approach” (Panagopoulou et al., 
2002) to explore how the disclosure of memories laden with negative affect may have 
beneficial effects upon physical health. Typically, within the EDP participants complete a 
disclosure task (usually, writing or talking about emotional experiences) on a number of 
occasions, and pre- and post health-related variables are assessed (see Pennebaker, 1997). For 
example, there have been studies using the ecologically valid measure of frequency of 
reported visits to general practitioners as an outcome variable; these studies have shown that, 
compared to controls, those who disclose negative affect laden memories subsequently make 
fewer visits to their general practitioner (Cameron & Nicholls, 1998; Francis & Pennebaker, 
 
1992; Greenberg & Stone, 1992; Greenberg, Wortman & Stone, 1996; Pennebaker & Beall, 
1986; Pennebaker, Barger, & Tiebout, 1989; Pennebaker & Francis, 1996; Pennebaker, 
Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988). In addition, there have been studies using immune system 
functionality measures as outcome variables: Pennebaker et al. (1988) looked at blastogenesis 
(t-helper cell response to phytohemagglutinin), Esterling, et al. (1994) examined Epstein-Barr 
virus antibody titers, and Petrie, Booth, and Pennebaker (1995) assessed hepatitis B antibody 
levels: to varying degrees, emotional disclosure has shown to be beneficial with respect to 
each of these immune response markers. In some studies, health outcomes have been 
assessed by a self report questionnaire (Richards et al., 2000; Sheese et al., 2004). One such 
measure is the Pennebaker Inventory of Limbic Languidness  (PILL, Pennebaker, 1982) 
which was designed to measure  reactions and sensations associated with heightened 
autonomic nervous system activity   Importantly, in the context of this paper, there has also 
been a focus upon the impact emotional disclosure has upon autonomic nervous system 
activity (Mendolia & Kleck, 1993; Pennebaker, Hughes, & O'Heeron, 1987; Hughes, 
Uhlmann & Pennebaker, 1994; Pennebaker, et al., 1989). Pennebaker et al. (1987), following 
Gray (1975) and Fowles (1980), suggest that the autonomic arousal caused by inhibition of 
emotional memories is specifically linked to increased skin conductance activity. The studies 
show that disclosure of particularly upsetting or traumatic experiences tends to decrease skin 
conductance levels (SCLs); conversely, individuals higher in emotional inhibition who find it 
difficult to disclose such experiences tend to have increased SCLs. 
Recently, a number of meta-analyses have been published that assess the efficacy of 
the EDP, with mixed results. Smyth (1998) looked at the effects of emotional [p.3] disclosure 
upon healthy people. Thirteen studies were meta-analysed and it was suggested that 
emotional disclosure significantly improved health in four outcome types: reported physical 
health, psychological well-being, physiological functioning, and general functioning. 
 
Frinsina, Borod and Lepore (2004) looked at the effects of emotional disclosure upon people 
with physical or psychiatric disorders. Nine studies were meta-analysed and it was suggested 
that, whilst emotional disclosure did significantly improve health, it was more effective for 
physical than psychological health outcomes. Finally, in the most comprehensive review, 
Meads and Nouwen (2005) looked at the effects of emotional disclosure upon both healthy 
participants and those with pre-existing morbidity. Sixty-one studies were meta-analysed and 
it was suggested that, for most outcome measures, there was no clear benefit associated with 
emotional disclosure: consequently, they argue that the paradigm is in need of reassessment. 
Pennebaker nevertheless continues to insist that a wealth of EDP studies support the efficacy 
of the paradigm, and cites over sixty on his website (see http://homepage:psy.utexas.edu). 
Analyses seeming to show adverse or inconclusive effects of emotional disclosure 
have been accounted for with respect to methodological issues such as variation in sample 
size, design, procedure, choice of outcome measure, and duration of study (Pennebaker, 
1997).  Although there is some variation in relation to theorising the embodied processes that 
lead to the reported health benefits of emotional disclosure (see Bryne-Davis et al. 2006 for a 
review), one of the key factors that researchers in the field have been concerned with is 
inhibition-confrontation. .  Psychological discussion of this relationship can be traced back to 
Breuer and Freud (1957/1895), who argued that the inhibition of traumatic emotional 
experiences causes psychological illness. Subsequently, following Anna Freud’s work, 
psychoanalysts have conceptualised two modes of emotional inhibition, suppression and 
repression: the former being a conscious process while the latter operates unconsciously 
(Anderson & Levy, 2002; Dalgleish, Mathews and Wood, 1999; Elderlyi, 2001; 2006; Ellis 
& Cromby, 2009; Kihlstrom, 2002). Elederlyi (2006) sought to further clarify this distinction 
by proposing that it rests upon two distinct processes of repression: inhibitory or subtractive 
processes (‘degrading the signal’), and elaborative or additive processes (‘adding noise to the 
 
signal’). A related distinction distinguishes between active (or controlled) processes of 
emotional inhibition and passive (or automatic) processes (Dalgleish, et al., 1999). Active 
inhibition is conceived of as being deliberate but operating on the edge of consciousness to 
constrain thoughts, feelings and behaviours, while passive inhibition is conceived of as the 
wholly non-conscious inhibition of affect (Ellis & Cromby, 2009). Other facets of debate 
address the question of how people learn to repress. In this regard Billig (1999) proposes that 
repression is first of all enacted in everyday conversation, which – in a broadly Vygotskian 
fashion – then provides the discursive tools for its individual operation. His analyses show 
how rhetorical and discursive psychological analyses can therefore be used to chart some of 
its workings. 
  The dominant model used to account for the associations between emotional 
disclosure and health outcomes is the inhibition-confrontation model. This model suggests 
that inhibition of trauma-related thoughts, feelings, and behaviours requires psycho-
physiological work, which produces autonomic arousal in the short term and places 
cumulative stress on the body in the long term (Pennebaker & Francis, 1996; Pennebaker, 
Kiecolt-Glazer & Glazer, 1988; Pennebaker & Susman, 1998; Petrie, Booth, & Pennebaker, 
1998). Inhibition is thus an active process which increases the risk of both physical illness 
[p.4] and mental distress. Talking or writing about emotionally laden traumatic experiences is 
seen as a relatively safe way of confronting them: having done so, inhibition is no longer 
necessary and so the stress it causes is reduced, with consequent health benefits. However, 
this model is limited because it does not consider other forms of emotional inhibition which 
might be the outcome of passive or automatic processes. It excludes the possibility that some 
ways of talking about emotional memories might not be beneficial, because they involve 
simply re-rehearsing the trauma, effectively re-living it in the present, rather than making 
new links between what happened and how the person now feels. Moreover, it encourages a 
 
view of inhibition operating solely as the consequence of an inner dynamic of personality, 
rather than also being thoroughly bound up with social relations, material circumstances, life 
events and situations. 
Further, within the EDP relatively little attention is typically paid to the form, 
structure or function of the narratives produced by participants. Researchers commonly 
conduct their analyses using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) programme, a 
computerised content-analysis application that calculates the percentage of words in various 
categories (e.g. Burke & Bradley, 2006; Campbell & Pennebaker, 2003; Fivush et al., 2007; 
Pennebaker & Francis, 1996; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997). A prominent LIWC 
category used to assess processes associated with emotional inhibition is ‘affect words’. 
These words, such as happy, bitter, and hate, and are treated as indicative of emotional 
expressiveness within the narratives. If a narrative contains many affect words it is likely to 
be said to display a significant amount of inhibition-confrontation; conversely, narratives low 
in affect words are likely to be considered as displaying a high amount of inhibition. 
Although the LIWC can categorise quite large percentages of the words that are included 
within disclosure narratives (Pennebaker and colleagues claim that the LIWC2007 version 
captures, on average, over 86 percent of the words people use in writing and speech 
(Pennebaker et al., 2007)), it is nevertheless quite limited in what it can reveal about the 
emotion related content of the disclosure and – thus - about the process of emotional 
inhibition which may be operating. This is because it fails to account for the context of the 
words it categorises, even though word meaning is at least partially context-dependent; it has 
a limited index of what may be considered emotional within a text, even though emotion can 
be verbally expressed in almost infinite ways; and because it first decomposes and then 
quantifies the narrative, and so is unable to include the ways in which narrative form and 
 
function might contribute to both the construction of meaning and the expression - or 
inhibition - of emotion. 
In recent years, health psychologists (particularly in the field of critical health 
psychology) have increasingly begun using qualitative research methods such as discourse 
analysis (Chamberlain et al, 1997; Willig, 2004). Compared to the quantitative content 
analysis generated by the LIWC, discourse analysis (DA) more effectively considers context, 
does not depend on pre-defined categories (for example of ‘emotion’), and is sensitive to the 
form and function of participants’ utterances as well as to their content. Thus far, however, 
DA has been largely neglected in relation to the EDP, despite its obvious relevance. DA 
addresses questions regarding the interactional function that utterances might serve; the 
meaning of variation both within and between narratives; the kinds of shared cultural 
resources that are drawn upon; and the ways that participants position themselves and others 
within their narratives. Answers to all of these questions may illuminate processes of 
emotional inhibition, since studies using [p.5] DA have consistently shown that talk of 
emotion is typically bound up with the achievement of functional, interactional goals, the 
management of presentation or ‘stake’, and the construction of legitimate, believable 
accounts (Edwards, 1999; Potter, 1996). DA adheres to a constructionist epistemology, which 
means it can be used to explore how participants construct versions of their experiences – for 
example, experiences of emotional events – and to explore how emotional enactments and 
discursive meanings are bound together in these processes of construction. 
Accordingly, the research that generated the data presented in this paper was a mixed-
methods study using DA in the context of an EDP design.  Measures of changes in skin 
conductance were used to identify (from a larger cohort) a small number of participants who, 
during the study, showed either significant increases or significant decreases in their SCLs. 
These participants’ narratives were then analysed using techniques drawn from DA, to 
 
investigate more closely the ways in which processes of emotional inhibition and expression 
may be enacted within narratives of emotional disclosure. To illustrate the multiple and 
complex ways which inhibition and inhibition-confrontation may occur, we have included a 
detailed case-study of one of the participants’ narratives that were produced throughout the 
study. 
   
MethodParticipants (n=32) were recruited through emails sent to all students within a UK 
university Department: 22 were female, 10 were male. Three quarters of participants were of 
white British ethnicity, and over half were between 18-24 years of age  and the rest were 
between 25-44 of age. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups, and were 
asked to talk freely (i.e. without any prompting from the researcher) about either a highly 
charged negative emotional experience (experimental group) or an emotionally neutral 
experience (control group). They did this on three separate occasions, a week apart. The 
narratives were audio-recorded; simultaneously, participants’ SCLs were continuously 
measured as they talked. On each occasion, participants also completed a battery of 
questionnaires to assess mood, life events, daily hassles and other influences which might 
impact upon their emotional state. Ethical approval for this study was given by the 
University’s ethics committee; all participants read an information sheet describing the 
procedures and goals of the research before signing consent forms; and they were assured of 
their right to withdraw at any point. Once narratives had been recorded and transcribed all 
identifying features, such as names and places, were altered to ensure anonymity. Statistical 
analyses of group differences in SCL were conducted in relation to measures from the LIWC 
and to variables generated by the various questionnaires, but these analyses will not be 
discussed here (see Ellis, 2006). 
 
Purposive sampling was used to select four participants for further, more detailed 
analysis; techniques drawn from DA were then used to examine the form and function of 
their accounts. Selection was conducted on the basis of SCL, and by comparison to the group 
baseline mean. Each of the 32 participants recorded three SCL baselines (one at each session) 
yielding 96 SCL baseline measures. The mean of these 96 measures was 3.25 µs; the standard 
deviation was 1.94 µs. Since “conductance values above 5-10 µs are thought to be relatively 
high, whereas those below 1 µs are thought to be low” (Peek, 2003, 73) the SCL baseline 
mean of [p.6] 3.25 µs falls within the expected range. In relation to this mean, four subgroups 
of participants were identified.. This included one participant from each of the neutral and 
emotion group who had the most significant decrease from week 1  to 3 away from BL mean 
and one participant from the neutral and emotion group who had the most significant increase 
from weeks 1 to 3 away from the BL mean. Following Jacobson and Truax (1991) clinical 
significance was defined here as a movement of one or more standard deviations either 
toward or away from the mean baseline SCL of the population. 
 
Below we present a DA of the narratives offered by the participant from the emotion 
group whose SCL displayed the greatest clinically significant increase away from the 
baseline mean. Participant 16, ‘Julie’, had a baseline SCL of 5.18 µs, this rose to 6.15 µs in 
week 2 and rose again  in week 3 to 8.61 µs – a move of nearly 2 SD’s away from the 
baseline mean of the sample.  
[Insert graph 1] 
Graph 1 illustrates Julie’s skin conductance activity throughout the three disclosure 
periods. The first section of each graph, shows the conductance levels as much lower than the 
rest of the graph, this is illustrates the period through which a base-line measure was taken of 
the participant’s conductance level before he began the actual disclosure task. Julie’s 
 
conductance levels remained relatively stable in period 1 and 2 (although the level of 
conductance is increased between periods) in period three we can see the level increases from 
the beginning of the disclosure period to the end of the period.  
Julie was a white, British, woman between the ages of 35-44. Although Julie was one 
of the older participants, he was one of five of the participants who were between the ages of 
35-44 and therefore could not be considered as an outlier in terms of age.  Julie was chosen as 
a case study for two particular reasons. Firstly, her SCLs increased more than any of the other 
participants. It was suspected therefore that there would be a significant amount of inhibition 
occurring throughout his disclosures. Secondly, her disclosure narratives are extremely 
interesting from a DA perspective as they are produced with a rich array of rhetorical devices. 
Therefore, we decided to focus on a single case study for analysis as this particular case 
introduces readers to a raft of ways that DA may be used to facilitate analysis of narratives in 
the context of the EDP and more particularly, illustrates some interesting aspects of what we 
determine here as being related to emotional inhibition.   
The version of DA used to analyse Julie’s narratives drew upon discursive psychology 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992) to examine how factuality is rhetorically produced and reproduced 
using discursive and rhetorical devices such as category entitlements (Potter, 1996); 
corroboration (Potter & Edwards, 1990; Potter; 1996); active voicing (Woofitt, 1992); 
modalization (Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Woolgar, 1988), and extrematization 
(Pomerantz, 1986). 
 
Results 
Julie’s narratives contained a gruelling account of witnessing the immediate aftermath of a 
motor vehicle accident which culminated in her attempting to stop a person from walking out 
onto a fogbound motorway; unfortunately, the person went onto the motorway anyway, and 
 
was run over and killed. For analytic purposes the narratives [p.8] were divided into subplots; 
the first subplot was labelled ‘the drunk-man’. In this sub-plot Julie describes meeting a man 
and woman standing on the road beside a crashed car. She explains that the man was drunk, 
and how she thought he was attempting to hide the ‘fact’ that he had been driving and caused 
the accident. A key emotion linked to this sub-plot is suspicion, “the feeling or thought of a 
person who suspects” (Swannell, 1992). In everyday parlance, the word feeling is frequently 
used as though it is synonymous with emotion, and also frequently used as though 
synonymous with thought or cognition (e.g.Prinz, 2004). Our analysis shows how ‘suspicion’ 
is worked up by Julie as a smooth interchange between thought/cognition and 
feeling/emotion. On the one hand, it can be seen as bound up with one of Julie’s ‘category of 
entitlement positions’ (see Potter, 1996) as a former police officer; on the other hand, and 
simultaneously, it constructs a logical argument that nevertheless leads to a false conclusion. 
In fulfilling both functions, Julie’s narrative also manages dilemmas of accountability, and 
raises issues related to emotional inhibition. 
At the start of the narrative, Julie describes how she and her friend Jack (an off duty 
but serving police officer) were driving back from a police Christmas social event along a 
foggy motorway. Upon seeing a crashed car they stopped, and went to speak to a man and a 
woman, whose car it was, and who were standing beside the motorway. Extract 1 shows how 
Julie portrays the man as the likely cause of the accident, since he is suspected to have been 
driving whilst under the influence of alcohol. 
Extract 1 (Week 1): 
145. the MAN was obviously drunk (1)  
146. obviously drunk (1) mm (2)  
147. so (.) we were talking to them  
148. saying how did it happen  
 
149. AND NONE of them  
150. neither of them would talk to us  
151. about how it happened (.)  
152. so (.) I don’t know whether it was being police officers [p.9]  
153. or whatever but Jack and I BOTH assumed (.)  
154. that the bloke had been driving (.)  
155. and that he’d caused this accident  
156. and that there was no way he was going to tell us  
157. what had happened (1) 
Julie begins by strongly emphasising that the man was drunk. This factual construction is 
rhetorically ratcheted up by simultaneously repeating the phrase (1: 145 – 146) and by the use 
of extrematization with the adverb “obviously”. These strategies build a definitive case: the 
man was drunk and there is no doubt or suspicion associated with this assertion.   
With respect to the construction of certainty, Latour and Woolgar present what they 
call a hierarchy of modalization: 
 X 
 X is a fact 
 I know that X 
 I claim that X 
 I believe that X 
 I hypothesise that X 
 I think that X 
 I guess that X 
 X is possible 
 (in Potter, 1996, p. 112) 
 
In relation to this hierarchy, the statement “the man was obviously drunk” is a relatively 
certain mode of construction. Latour and Woolgar suggest that such statements are typically 
treated as largely unproblematic, and so usually not needing clarification or explanation. 
Indeed, Julie does not present details to explain or justify this claim, which is presented as 
simply factual.  However, as Extract 2 begins to show, the later parts of this narrative are 
more problematic for Julie: 
 Extract 2 (Week 2) 
188. and (1) we were talking to them (.)  
189. you know (.) and they wouldn’t say how it happened (.)  
190. which I suppose heightened our suspicions (1) 
Here, the term ‘suspicions’ (like the term ‘assumed’ at 1: 153) lies somewhere toward the 
middle of Latour and Woolgar’s hierarchy; hence, further explanation is given concerning the 
nature of the assumption/suspicion. For analytic purposes the explanation can be broken 
down into the construction of three distinct but related facts: 
a) In extract 1, Julie states that they “BOTH assumed” that the man had been driving. Here, 
the heavily emphasised word “both” adds corroboration to Julie’s claim, whilst also perhaps 
simultaneously alleviating or sharing responsibility for the interpretation. 
b) The category of entitlement ‘police officers’ is invoked to further legitimise their emerging 
joint suspicion, since police officers might reasonably be expected to have relevant expertise 
in determining the validity of suspicion, whether through skill and training, experience, or 
both [p.10] 
c) In extract 2, the silence of the couple concerning the cause of the accident is constructed as 
further “heightening” both Jack and Julie’s suspicions. 
Extract 3 shows how Julie then goes on to further develop her account and, along the 
way, legitimise and account for her and Jack’s suspicious stance: 
 
Extract 3 (Week 2): 
197. and (.) the MAN wanted his GLASSES (.) 
198. and he wanted a cigarette  
199. so we said alright where’s your glasses (.)  
200. he said they’re in the car well we you know (.)  
201. forget your glasses  
202. you’re not (1) you’re fine without them (.)  
203. I want a cigarette (.)  
204. OK you can have one of Jack’s cigarettes (1)  
205. so Jack gave him a cigarette  
206. but he was (1) ADAMANT  
207. HE was going to go back to his car (.)  
Here, various elements of the situation are presented which, together, serve to further warrant 
Julie’s and Jack’s suspiciousness. The sequential manner of presentation poses implicit 
questions which we are led to imagine that she and Jack were asking themselves: why did the 
man want to get his glasses from the car? why did he have to get his own cigarettes and not 
take one of ours? Julie then goes on to answer these questions: 
Extract 4 (Week 3) 
298. it was the only vehicle that was involved (1) 
299. you know (.) nobody else involved mm (1) 
And so: 
Extract 5 (Week 2) 
208. and we thought (.) right  
209. YOU’VE been DRIVING  
210. your GLASSES are obviously on the DRIVER’S side  
 
211. you want to get them  
212. to REMOVE them (.) 
. . . . .  
216. but (.) this is what was going through my mind (.)  
217. you know you want to HIDE the evidence  
218. of the FACT that you were driving (1)  
219. you know (.)  
220. BOLLOCKS you’re going nowhere 
Thus, Julie and Jack’s joint suspicions are constructed as flowing logically from a series of 
self-evident premises: 
Premise 1: the man was drunk 
Premise 2: the couple would not speak about how the accident happened 
Premise 3: the man wanted to get his glasses from the car for no apparent reason 
Premise 4: the man wanted his own cigarettes from the car, even though we offered him one 
of ours [p.11] 
Premise 5: no other people or cars were involved in the accident 
Conclusion: He wanted to get back to the car so that he could rearrange items in the car so 
that he could cover up the fact that he was drunk driving and thus caused the accident 
Thus, in extract 5 Julie’s suspicion that the man was drink-driving has become a firm belief. 
The ‘fact’ that “your glasses are obviously on the driving side” (5: 210) is closely followed 
by “the fact that you were driving” (5(: 218). Both claims are no longer in the middle of the 
hierarchy of modalization as mere suspicions, but are presented as being at the top, as 
“obvious” and simply, factually true. By dint of these various discursive and rhetorical 
moves, suspicion gets constructed as a wholly rational process of feeling and thinking. The 
 
feeling of suspicion is professionalised by use of the ‘police officer’ category entitlement, and 
worked up as a skilled sense of or feeling for the ‘truth’. 
These moves reinforce Julie’s identity position as the rational good citizen by contrast 
to the irrational and irresponsible ‘drunk-man’. Julie nevertheless further legitimises the shift 
from ‘suspicion’ to ‘fact’ by constructing it as being continuously corroborated, albeit extra-
discursively, by Jack. 
Extract 6 (Week 3) 
284. and all this AND (.) Jack and I (1)  
285. rightly or wrongly BOTH presumed  
286. and I DON’T think we actually communicated this (1)  
287. but we were sort of looking at each other  
288. and (.) you know we both accused the man of driving  
289. although we didn’t actually SAY THAT to him 
290. we said (.) you know what’s happened  
291. whose was driving (.) mm (1)  
292. and I THINK the fact that there was no lights  
293. on the car was also mentioned at this stage to them 
294. (1) AND (.) we BOTH thought  
295. that the BLOKE had been driving (1)  
296. because he was drunk  
As this extract suggests, throughout the narratives Julie consistently portrays her suspicion as 
being both rational-cognitive and shared in equal measure by Jack. In extract 1 she says “Jack 
and I BOTH assumed” (1: 153); similarly in extract 6 says “we BOTH presumed” (6:285). 
Whilst presumption (“a belief based on fact that something is considered to be extremely 
reasonable or likely” - Swannell, 1992) is stronger than assumption, what seems most 
 
significant in both cases is the powerful emphasis placed on the word “both”. Similarly, Julie 
later describes how ”we both accused” the man of drink-driving (6: 288) – albeit without 
actually saying so; and other phrases throughout her narratives (“and we thought”; “we both 
thought”) further legitimate her suspicion with reference to its shared character. At the same 
time, however, this construction of her suspicion as reasonable by virtue of being shared is 
potentially comprised by the way in which these shared suspicions were communicated solely 
through extra-discursive activity - presumably facial expressions, postures and tones of voice. 
Julie describes herself as having a definite sense that Jack also felt suspicious, and portrays 
them both as simply knowing each other’s thoughts concerning the drunk-man’s driving, 
even though no words on the subject [p.12] were exchanged. This is not to deny that such 
extra-discursive communication occurs; simply to highlight an apparent tension in Julie’s 
accounts between the highly rational construction of her (and Jack’s) suspicions and the more 
uncertain means by which their shared understanding was developed. 
Some of the significance of this tension perhaps becomes apparent when, toward the 
end of narrative 2, Julie makes an admission: 
 Extract 7 (Week 2) 
was mm (1) I got a letter from the woman (.)  
.. 
and her and I met up a couple of times  
and had some lunch together  
and sort of (.) talked about the accident 
and it was then that (.) she (.) SHE was driving (1)  
HE was drunk and he’d grabbed the wheel (.)  
so HE WAS to blame but SHE was driving 
so I then felt really guilty 
 
Here, Julie constructs herself as feeling “really guilty” as a consequence of the faulty logical 
conclusion reached by herself and Jack. In this context, the amount of discursive and 
rhetorical work she undertakes to construct her suspicions as both shared and reasonable 
becomes more understandable. However, it seems that Julie may feel guilty, not only for her 
misplaced suspicion, but for the consequences that followed from it, set out here in her 
description of how she and her colleague attempted to physically prevent the man back from 
going back to the crashed car: 
Extract 8 (Week 1) 
 NO you’re not going anywhere near your car (2)  
 a little TUSSLE (.) that’s all I can describe 
 as he (.) he DID (.) he BROKE free (.) 
 and he RAN across the Motorway(1) to his car 
As the man ran into the motorway he was knocked over by oncoming traffic: instead of being 
able to make a calculated decision about when to cross, we are presented with a picture of 
him being held back and struggling, then breaking free, bounding suddenly across the road 
and being knocked over. However, in drawing attention to this feature of Julie’s account, we 
are in no way judging or blaming her - or indeed anyone else. It was a dark, foggy night, the 
man was intoxicated, and there seemed to be no obvious reason why he should risk his life, 
and those of other people, by returning to the crashed car. Yet, at that moment, it seems clear 
that he felt strongly that he should do so, and he no doubt had his reasons for this - just as 
Julie and Jack had good reasons for trying to stop him. It nevertheless seems clear that Julie’s 
feeling “really guilty” is not simply about the error of interpretation she made, but about its 
unintended, fatal consequence. 
 
Discussion 
 
Not only did Julie’s SCL move almost two SD’s away from the baseline mean of the 
participants, this move was an increase when, according to the EDP, her SCL should have 
decreased because she was in the experimental (disclosure) group. What could have 
happened to produce this contradictory effect? [p.13] 
From the perspective of the inhibition-confrontation model, we might expect to find 
Julie’s narrative all-but devoid of emotion. By deliberately not recognising or talking about 
the emotions associated with this traumatic memory, the inhibition- confrontation model 
would say, she preserves them intact and they then serve to raise her SCL. However, even a 
cursory reflection on the DA of her narratives shows that, on the one hand, Julie does talk of 
emotional states (particularly guilt, in the extracts presented here, but other states are also 
indexed). And on the other hand, the frequent patterns of emphases and pauses throughout 
her talk serve to load what she says with a sometimes-powerful affective charge, suggesting 
that she was also quite actively emotionally engaged in the lived moment of recounting the 
memory. Clearly, then, whatever emotional inhibition Julie might be enacting is not simply 
‘active’ or conscious, and nor does it seem to be simply the case that the totality of her 
emotions are being blocked or denied expression. 
Accordingly, we might deploy notions of passive inhibition or repression, acting 
automatically and non-consciously and serving to deny expression to the painful emotions 
associated with her most difficult memories. From this perspective, we might argue that Julie 
is unconsciously shielding herself from the most excruciating aspects of what occurred, by 
denying expression to the most difficult and damaging emotions associated with her 
memories. By only giving vent to those emotions she feels are safe, acceptable and not 
overwhelming, perhaps, Julie preserves an acceptable sense of herself : but this comes at the 
cost of preventing the disclosure from being therapeutic, and indeed of increasing rather than 
decreasing her SCL. Whilst this explanation is potentially more satisfying than that supplied 
 
from within the inhibition-confrontation model, it too seems inadequate in some respects. For 
one, at no point does Julie seem to shy away from any of the most traumatic and painful 
details of her memory: in addition to the details presented here, for example, elsewhere she 
describes how the man’s body was actually run over by more than one car, and how she and 
Jack faced the dilemma of whether to try to retrieve him from the motorway in case he was 
still alive. She also describes graphically her shocked, traumatic state in the hours, days and 
weeks following these events. And for another, rather than being affectively flat or 
emotionally neutral, Julie’s talk is continuously emotionally loaded throughout the recounting 
of the narratives. And although her feelings of guilt get framed in relation to an error of 
reasoning rather than simply with respect to the drunk-man’s death, she does talk openly 
about this very painful emotion and seems quite aware of its intimate linkage to the tragic 
outcome of the sequence of events. Passive inhibition, then, seems to provide only a partial 
explanation for the contradictory rise in Julie’s SCL; accordingly, we want to draw attention 
to other influences which might be responsible for it not only failing to decrease but actually 
increasing. Three aspects, in particular, seem relevant. 
First, despite assurances of confidentiality and neutrality and the adoption of an 
explicitly non-directive interviewing style, it remains possible that during the study Julie 
continued to work to justify her actions: to herself, and perhaps also to the interviewer. The 
narratives she produced were rich with discursive and rhetorical manoeuvres and fluctuating 
identity positions, many of which seemed designed to bolster and legitimate both her 
suspicions and her actions, to normalise them as the kind of thing anyone might have done in 
such extreme, difficult circumstances. Interviews to gather psychological data are never 
themselves devoid of social influence but are, patently, particular kinds of social situation. 
Julie’s orientation [p.14] toward the normative social requirements to present herself as a 
good person, a responsible citizen, and a co-operative, thoughtful psychological subject, may 
 
have meant that she engaged with the social situation of the interviews in ways that increased, 
rather than decreased her emotional arousal. 
Second, Julie’s narratives appear to be “well worn stories” (Kehily, 1995) that have 
been rehearsed many times over a number of years. Thus the memory of the story, as told and 
re-told, may have to some extent replaced the event as experienced. There are complex issues 
here to do with the way that affect and memory are related in the re-telling of traumatic 
memories, and the consequent ways in which ‘virtual’, affectively charged events can get re-
told or ‘actualised’ on subsequent occasions (for discussions, see Haaken & Reavey, 2009). 
Suffice it to say that years of repetition may have rendered Julie’s narratives somewhat 
emotionally incongruent with those that actually occurred at the time, loading the emotions of 
the original experience with the more recent, frequently rehearsed emotions of their 
(re)telling. 
Third, in all of Julie’s narratives there is a tendency to denigrate and marginalise 
emotional states. Although this is not explicit in the extracts we have given above, Julie tends 
to  portray emotions as signs of weakness and a hindrance to logical thought. For example, at 
one point Julie states,  
Extract 9 (Week 3)   
453. and it was almost like (1) my emotions  
454. were (.) were CHARGED 
455. that’s how I could (.) feel  
456. I was ALMOST BUZZING with my emotions (.)  
457. but SOMEWHERE in the back of my mind (.)  
458. the sensible part of me (.)  
459. the LOGICAL part of me (.)  
460. TOOK OVER to SAY (.)  
461. you’ve got to do this  
462. you’ve got to do that (.)  
463. you’ve got to stop these people going into the road 
 
As a former police officer, Julie would have been very aware that highly charged emotional 
states frequently serve to reduce the credence of witness accounts given in court; and indeed, 
it is perhaps relevant she had given evidence about the man’s death to a coroner’s court. 
Moreover, as a consequence of her police training, Julie must have been well rehearsed 
(perhaps unintentionally) to tell her story with respect to the kind of clear, rational causal 
links that are necessary for stories told in legal contexts to be considered believable (Gergen 
and Gergen, 1988). Relatedly, Howard et al. (2000) found that police officers in New Zealand 
utilised what was described as a discourse of “unspeakability” with respect to emotions, 
which were typically “framed as dangerous and threatening to performance, demanding 
management and control” and this in turn “enabled officers to present themselves as both 
culturally and professionally competent” (Howard et al., 2000, p.295). Returning to Billig’s 
(1999) account of how repression is learned, then, we might suggest that these occupational 
imperatives taught Julie how to repress discursively in ways that, subsequently, made it 
difficult for her to benefit from simply talking about her emotional memories 
Thus, some mixture of these three influences may have combined to produce, for 
Julie, a particular style of emotional disclosure, a style associated with raised rather [p.15] 
than lowered SCL. First, the normative demand to be a good psychological subject may have 
meant that the emotions enacted by her in the lived moments of disclosure may themselves 
have been productive of raised SCL. Second, the familiarity of the story may have meant that 
the emotions of its telling have at least partially replaced the emotions of its occurrence. And 
third, Julie’s professional training and experience may have inadvertently endowed her with a 
critical stance toward her own emotions, which may at least partially prevent her gaining any 
cathartic benefit from talking about them. It would seem, then, that emotional disclosure is a 
far more complicated practice than can be wholly captured by either the inhibition-
confrontation model, or by notions of suppression or passive inhibition. Moreover, rather 
 
than being the simple outcome of an internal dynamic or personality characteristic, our 
analysis suggests that it is already bound up with both past and present social relations and 
situations, such that the actual occasions of disclosure, and their specific characteristics, 
might influence its character and effects. If this is so, any reassessment of the EDP’s efficacy 
and value might usefully take account of such considerations. 
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Transcription conventions 
 
Underlining (talk is quieter) indicates words or parts of speech that is quieter than the 
surrounding speech. 
Capital letters (talk is LOUDER) indicates words or parts of speech that are louder than the 
surrounding speech. 
Numbers or full stops in brackets (then she paused (1) first by one second (.) then by half a 
second) indicates pauses. The number (2) represents the amounts of seconds the speech is 
paused by and a full stop (.) represents a pause less than one second. 
 
Each line of speech on a given narrative transcript has been divided into clauses. These 
clauses are numbered. For example: 
23. this is one clause 
24. and this is the second clause 
Each extract starts with the participant’s number and indicates whether the extract is taken 
from either the first, second, or third narrative that was recited by the participant. For 
example: 
16.1 
1. the above indicates 
2. participant 16’s first narrative recital 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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SCLs of participant 16 (Julie) 
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